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Modelling the Price of Unleaded Petrol 
in Australia’s Capital Cities 
 
  Abbas Valadkhania 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the long-run and short-run determinants of unleaded petrol price in 
Australia’s capital cities using monthly data to find out whether prices respond 
asymmetrically to external shocks. Based on the cointegration test results and the 
estimated asymmetric short-run dynamic models, it is found that: (1) in the long-run 
petrol prices are mainly determined by Tapis crude oil and Singapore petrol prices; (2) 
there is some evidence of asymmetric price adjustments in the short-run since petrol price 
increases have been mostly passed on to the consumer faster than price decreases in four 
capital cities. More specifically, this paper provides convincing evidence in support of 
asymmetric price adjustments and the “rockets-and-feathers hypothesis” in Adelaide, 
Brisbane Melbourne and Sydney. One can thus argue that there are a significant degree of 
market inefficiency and/or collusion, requiring a closer government price monitoring and 
scrutiny. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
For many Australians petrol expenses constitute a substantial part of their fortnightly 
income and petrol price rises have a direct, and appreciable effect on their standard of 
living (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission Inquiry, ACCC, 2007). 
Valadkhani and Mitchell (2002) have examined the expected impact of petrol price rises 
on inflation. Although they found that the Australian economy is less vulnerable to oil 
price rises now than it was in the 1970s, the distributional impacts of price rises are more 
pronounced on poor families. They estimate that, if petrol prices are doubled, ceteris 
paribus, the rate of inflation accelerates by an additional 2 per cent on the top of what 
otherwise would have prevailed in the economy. Their results clearly indicate that the 
transport and agricultural sectors would mostly bear the cost of this price rise and the 
price rises are regressive in their impact (Valadkhani & Mitchell 2002). Therefore, it can 
be argued that petrol prices can significantly contribute to the rising rates of inflation in 
Australia. 
Concern about Australia’s petrol prices has been the subject of several inquiries 
(e.g. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 1996, 2007; Industry 
Commission, IC 1994; Queensland Parliament 2006). According to FuelWatch (2009), 
Tapis crude oil prices (not West Texas Intermediate, which is the US market benchmark) 
and the Singapore price of Mogas 95 petrol are the major supply-side determinants of 
Australia’s petrol prices
1. The terminal gate prices usually make up around 95 per cent of 
pump prices. The wholesale price is typically based on a rolling average of: the spot price 
for the Singapore Mogas 95 unleaded petrol, the allocated shipping cost from Singapore 
to Australia, insurance, wharfage cost, and conversion from US dollars to Australian 
dollars. The Singapore price of petrol plus shipping costs and Australian taxes constitute 
95 per cent of the wholesale price of petrol (FuelWatch 2009). The major objectives of 
this paper are to answer (test) the following questions (hypotheses) for each of seven 
capital cities, for which disaggregated monthly price data are readily available: First, do 
unleaded retail petrol prices respond asymmetrically to external shocks such as changes in 
crude oil prices or international petrol prices? If crude oil prices and/or the Singapore 
benchmark petrol prices increase, will the Bacon’s (1991) “rockets-and-feathers 
hypothesis” be applicable in the context of Australia? That is to say, will petrol prices 
“shoot up like rockets” in response to say positive oil price shocks and “float down like 
feathers” in response to price falls? In other words, will petrol prices respond quickly 
following a rise in the price of crude oil, but fall much slower to crude-oil price 
decreases?  Second, when crude oil prices and/or the Singapore benchmark petrol price 
increase (due to external shocks), on average, how much does the retail price of petrol 
rise in various capital cities? 
This paper provides an analytical framework for making more informed and 
objective assessments of the sources of Australia’s unleaded petrol price fluctuations, 
resulting in greater efficiency and transparency of retail petrol market. Using an entirely 
different approach, this study systematically examines the magnitude and dynamics of 
petrol price responses to global macroeconomic influences. Although previous studies 
and surveys (undertaken or commissioned mainly by the ACCC) have already covered 
this topic, they do not provide answers to all of the questions indicated above. Enough 
disaggregated time series data are now available to enable a meaningful econometric 
analysis of this issue. This study will be the first independent (non-government) academic 
study which will systematically examine the asymmetric effects of changes in (a) Tapis 
                                                       
1 Mogas 95 unleaded petrol is considered to be the closest substitute for Australian regular unleaded petrol. 
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crude oil prices; and (b) the Singapore benchmark price. It identifies the major sources of 
asymmetric fluctuations in unleaded petrol prices by using threshold and asymmetric 
error-correction models. The proposed models in this study have been adopted in similar 
contexts in the literature (see for example Al-Gudhea, Kenc & Dibooglu 2007; Bachmeier 
& Griffin 2003; Borenstein, Cameron & Gilbert 1997; Chen, Finney & Lai 2005; 
Radchenko 2005) and provide useful policy-relevant frameworks that can be used to 
forecast petrol prices across various parts of Australia and to evaluate the potential 
outcomes of policies and external events on those prices. 
To date, there is no publicised Australian study that includes all major petrol price 
determinants in one single dynamic model and investigates the significance of each 
variable in explaining asymmetry in the retail distribution process. For example, Reilly 
and Witt (1998) included both the price of crude oil and the exchange rate in the UK to 
test the competing explanations for the asymmetric response. In addition, according to the 
recent inquiry of the ACCC (2007), average Australian retail petrol prices broadly follow 
the movements in the Singapore benchmark price. Al-Gudhea, Kenc and Dibooglu (2007) 
argue that the crude oil price is a principal determinant of changes in petrol prices but 
there are several other major determinants such as the exchange rate and the Singapore 
benchmark price if a significant portion of petrol is to be imported. Previous studies have 
not included all of these factors together. The omission of such factors constitutes omitted 
variable bias and invalidates their policy conclusions. 
Therefore, in order to avoid mis-specified models, it is of paramount importance 
to include all major determinants of petrol prices in a model. This relatively important 
issue seems to have been neglected in previous econometric analysis of the Australian 
petrol market. This paper examines the issue of petrol price asymmetries in regard to not 
only the crude price but also in relation to the Singapore petrol prices where all variables 
are expressed in Australian currency. 
Empirical findings on price asymmetry for North American markets have been 
mixed and ambiguous. For example, Chen, Finney and Lai (2005) use switching 
thresholds in a cointegration model of price adjustment and find evidence of asymmetry 
not only in short- and long-run adjustment but also across the spot and future markets. 
Balke, Brown & Yu¨cel(1998); Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997); Galeotti, Lanza 
and Manera (2003) and Karrenbrock (1991) have examined the same issue and concluded 
that not only petrol price increases are passed on to the consumer faster than price 
decreases but also petrol prices respond asymmetrically to changes in oil prices. But on 
the other hand, several other studies (e.g. Bachmeier & Griffin 2003; Godby et al. 2000) 
are quite skeptical of this view, arguing for no evidence of asymmetry between petrol 
prices and crude oil prices. As stated above, little substantive empirical work has been 
conducted regarding the dynamic effects of a change in crude oil prices on Australia’ 
retail petrol prices. This project for the first time will adopt the threshold and asymmetric 
error-correction models to resolve the ongoing controversy over whether retail unleaded 
prices rise more readily than they fall due to external shocks in the petroleum or foreign 
exchange markets. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses briefly the 
theoretical framework of the threshold cointegration analysis employed in the paper. 
Section 3 presents the sources and summary statistics of the data employed as well as the 
unit root test results. Section 4 presents the empirical econometric results. Finally the last 
section offers some concluding comments. 
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2.  Theoretical Framework 
 
Unlike other commodities, petrol prices are more changeable. Petrol stations may charge 
higher prices on some days of the week to offset the losses associated with deeply 
discounted days. In some locations prices follow a weekly cycle, whereby petrol is 
generally cheapest on Tuesdays (for example) and more expensive during weekends and 
at the start of public holidays
2. How can we incorporate these stylised facts in our model? 
In order to exclude unnecessary noise associated with the day-of-the week effect and 
focus on major sources of petrol price rises, monthly data are used in this paper. The data 
include Tapis crude oil prices, Singapore petrol price and retail average petrol prices for 
seven capital cities (Adelaide, Brisbane, Darwin, Hobart, Pert, Melbourne and Sydney). 
The monthly data span from May 1998 to January 2009 totalling 129 observations. The 
long-run relationship between the retail petrol price (p) and its three major determinants 
has been specified in equation (1): 
01 2 3 jt t t t jt po s T α αααε = ++++                     (1) 
where:  
pjt= the natural logarithm of unleaded petrol price $A (where j denotes one of the seven 
capital cities in Australia (j=1,2,…,7),  
ot=the natural logarithm of Tapis crude oil prices per barrel in $A, 
st=the natural logarithm of Singapore (Mogas 95) petrol prices in Australian cents per 
gallon, and  
Tt is a time trend variable, where 1998M5=1 and 2009M01=129, 
The estimated  s α are the long-run coefficients, which are expected to be all positive. 
It is important to recognise that “successive Commonwealth Governments since 
1977 have adopted an import parity pricing policy to determine national pricing levels for 
all motor fuels. This means the domestic price for petrol in Australia is linked to 
international petrol prices to ensure local refiners will not sell their offshore to obtain 
higher prices (and potentially leave no fuel for the local market) (FuelWatch, 2009, p.1). 
Let us now assume that all of the variables appearing on both sides of equation (1) 
are I(1). According to Engle and Granger (1987), the stationary residuals resulting from 
equation (1) could then form an error correction (EC) mechanism representing the short-
run deviation from the long run equilibrium (if any). That is: 
N N
11 1 0 1 1 2 1 3
Long-run path Deviation from  Actual value
the long-run path
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ () jt jt jt t t t EC p o s T 1 ˆ ε αα α α −− − − − == − + + +   	 
 −
                                                     
              (2) 
Standard cointegration tests implicitly assume a symmetric adjustment process but 
if petrol price adjustments are asymmetric or if prices are sticky in the downward 
direction, these tests can be mis-specified. In other words, the Engle-Granger (1987) type 
tests with a linear adjustment procedure will be inappropriate when the dynamic 
adjustment of prices in fact could follow a non-linear behaviour. If the Johansen (1995) 
cointegration trace test indicates that there is only one cointegrating vector, then the 
underlying adjustment dynamics of petrol prices in response to changes in exogenous 
variables can be captured by using the following threshold error-correction model (Enders 
and Granger, 1998, Enders and Siklos, 2001): 
 
2 These weekly price cycles may be associated with supply management, with deep discounting arising, for 
example, immediately prior to the next delivery of fuel to the retailer, by the wholesaler. 
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where:  
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++ + + Δ= Δ ⇒ Δ= Δ Δ≥ Δ= Δ< ,
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The variables t s
+ Δ and  are defined exactly in the same way as and t s
− Δ jt o
+ Δ jt o
− Δ . 
Depending on whether the changes in explanatory variables are positive or negative (the 
threshold being zero),  , i γ
+ , i γ
−
i η
+and  i η
−are the estimated short-run coefficients. 
However, it is not necessary to assume that the threshold value( ) τ  is always equal to zero 
for the θ  feedback coefficient. In equation (4) It is the Heaviside indicator and τ or the 
optimum value of threshold are determined endogenously such that: 
jt-1
jt-1
ˆ 1 if 
 
ˆ 0 if 
t I
ε τ
ε τ
< ⎧ ⎪ = ⎨ ≥ ⎪ ⎩
                                  (4) 
Therefore, j θ
−and  j θ
+are the different speeds of adjustment on the basis of the 
deviations from long-run. It should be noted that when the null of  jj θ θ
− =
)
+ cannot be 
rejected, price adjustments are no longer asymmetric and this can be done by conducting 
a standard F-test. Given that the value of the threshold is unknown, its value( τ should be 
empirically determined. A consistent value of the threshold can be found by undertaking a 
grid search by first sorting the jt ˆ ε sequence in an ascending order as proposed by Enders 
and Siklos (2001). To have enough observations in each regime, I will look at each  jt ˆ ε  
within the middle 70% of the observations (excluding the first and last 15 per cent of the 
total number of observations) and whatever value of the threshold which yields the lowest 
residual sum of squares will be considered as a consistent estimate of the threshold. 
 
Figure 1 
Graphical definition of the asymmetric price adjustment 
 
 
Note: The dotted and solid lines show the actual (short-run) and the long-run price of petrol, respectively. 
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The asymmetric price adjustment process can be better understood by using a 
graph. In Figure 1 if actual prices in the short-run (the dotted line) are below the long-run 
path (the solid line) say at a point between (a) and (b), retail distributors are more likely to 
increase their price immediately to the equilibrium level. Thus, a higher relative speed of 
adjustment (or the feedback coefficient) is expected. On the other hand, if the short-run 
price is above the long-run path, retail suppliers are more likely to keep their price at that 
level as long as possible or reduce their price to the equilibrium very sluggishly. 
Therefore, the asymmetric short-run price adjustments do exist if  jj θ θ
+ − > . Graphically 
this means that in Figure 1 the speed at which the short-run price converges to the long-
run path would be greater between points (a) and (b) compared to the one located 
between (b) to (c). There are also 11 dummy variables,  , in equation (3) capturing 
the month of the year effect. 
it DUM
As stated earlier, the optimum threshold values are not necessarily equal to zero 
when: 1 1 1 0 11 21 31 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ () jt jt jt t t t EC p o s T 0 ε αα α α − −− −−− =⇒− + + + =  
 Therefore, on average the optimal threshold value ( ) τ could then be located: (1) at the 
intersection points (a) or (b) or (c), where 0 τ = ; or (2) at a point between (a) and (b) such 
as (a’), where 0 τ < ; or (3) at a point between (b) and (c) such as (b’), where 0 τ > . 
Equation (3) can be interpreted as a two-regime vector error-correction model with a 
single cointegrating vector and an endogenously-determined threshold effect in the error-
correction term. This equation allows for an asymmetric adjustment response working not 
only through the deviation from the long-run path (Hansen and Seo, 2002) but also 
through positive and negative short-run dynamic effects of the two exogenous variables in 
the model (i.e.  , i γ
+ , i γ
−
i η
+and  i η
−). Bachmeier and Griffin (2003); Borenstein, Cameron 
and Gilbert (1997); Granger and Lee (1989) and Radchenko (2005) suggest this flexible 
framework to capture any asymmetric effects by alternating regimes as periods of either 
rising or falling prices associated with each of these possible sources. 
It is not counterintuitive to assume that the two explanatory variables to be at least 
weakly exogenous as their values are highly likely to be determined outside of the vector 
error correction system: crude oil and the Singapore petrol prices in global petroleum 
markets and the exchange rate (appearing in the denominator converting $US to 
Australian currency) in Forex markets around the globe. Thus, while upstream price 
shocks will affect petrol prices contemporaneously, petrol price shocks may impact on 
upstream prices after some lags. Our results (not reported in this paper) indicate no 
simultaneity problem. Using equation (3) and a Wald test, one can then test whether or 
not the relationship between the price of petrol and each of its determinants is 
asymmetric. Based on the test results, the short run asymmetric petrol price responses can 
be tested as follows: 
•  Changes in crude oil prices can exert asymmetry effects on petrol prices if 
 is rejected. 
1
0 :   ii Hi γγ
+− =∀
•  Changes in the Singapore petrol prices will impact asymmetrically on petrol 
prices if   is rejected. 
2
0 :   ii Hi ηη
+− =∀
•  The deviation from the long-run path or EC will have an asymmetric effect on 
petrol prices if 
3
0 : H θ θ
+ =
− is rejected.  
Equation (3) will be estimated for all possible combinations of the values of the 
lags (ranging between 0-5). The threshold parameter for EC appearing on the right hand 
side of equation (3) will be determined endogenously using a standard grid search. In the 
grid search for the best threshold value, the minimum value of grid will be incremented 
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by 0.0001 sequentially till the maximum value is reached.  To have enough observations 
in each regime, ECjt are first sorted in ascending order, and based on the middle 70 per 
cent of the observations, the minimum and maximum gird search values are determined. 
Ceteris paribus, any value of the threshold which yields the lowest residual sum of 
squares in equation (3) will be considered as a consistent estimate of the threshold. The 
optimum lag length (k) is chosen on the basis of the AIC. The general-to-specific 
methodology is used to omit insignificant variables in equation (3) on the basis of a 
battery of maximum likelihood tests as well as the AIC. In this method, joint zero 
restrictions are imposed on current and lagged explanatory variables in the unrestricted 
(general) model to obtain the most parsimonious and robust equation in the estimation 
process. 
 
3.  The Data 
 
Before estimating equations (1) and (3) and report our empirical results, it is important to 
look at the sources and definitions of the data employed in Table 1. The monthly data 
cover the period May 1998 to January 2009 for all variables indicated in equation (1) 
including the price of unleaded petrol for seven capital cities: Adelaide, Brisbane, 
Darwin, Hobart, Melbourne, Perth and Sydney. All the figures in this paper are in 
Australian dollar unless otherwise is stated. Over this period, Brisbane (92.8 cents) and 
Darwin (109.2 cents) witnessed the lowest and the highest average unleaded petrol prices, 
respectively. Monthly minimum price of petrol varied from 63.3 cents in Adelaide to a 
maximum of 173.4 cents in Darwin. Based on the coefficient of variation (CV), Brisbane 
and Darwin had the most and the least volatile petrol prices across Australia. Average 
monthly price of Tapis crude oil ($63.4 per  barrel) over the same period was the most 
volatile series with the highest coefficient of variation (47.4 per cent). The price of 
Singapore unleaded petrol was the second most volatile series with the CV of 42.6 per 
cent, fluctuating from 13.8 to 91.8 cents per litre. The reported skewness, Kurtosis and 
Jarque-Bera statistics in Table 1 indicate that none of the variables are normally 
distributed. The results of the ADF test are also presented in Table 1, indicating that all of 
the variables appearing in equation (1) are I(1). 
The plots of the price data have been presented in Figure 2. As can be seen, petrol 
prices in all seven capital cities of Australia very closely follow the national average price 
series. While due to state government subsidy in Queensland (i.e. 8.5 cents per litre), 
petrol prices in Brisbane appear to be slightly below the corresponding national average 
price throughout the period, the opposite is the case for Darwin and Hobart. The overall 
average price of petrol also closely tracks the movements of both Tapis crude oil price 
and the Singapore petrol price. Therefore, one would expect that there would be a 
significant long-run relationship as formulated in equation 1 for each of the seven capital 
cities. Table 2 presents the results of the Johansen (1995) cointegration trace test as stated 
in equation (1). Consistent with the results of the Engle-Granger (1987) test and a visual 
inspection of the data in Figure 2, these results also clearly indicate that there is one 
statistically significant cointegrating vector within each capital cities at the 0.05 level. 
Both the final prediction error and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) have 
consistently point to an optimal lag length of 3 for all cities except in the case of Hobart 
that this lag is found to be two based on the same two criteria. 
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Figure 2 
Plots of the employed data 
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              Source: See Table 1. 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
 
Table 3 presents an OLS estimation of equation (1) for each of the seven capital cities 
over the period May 1998-January 2009. Based on the last two columns of this table, the 
resulting residuals from the estimated long-run equations are all I(0) at 1 per cent level of 
significance, supporting the notion of cointegration according to the Engle and Granger 
(1987) two step procedure. The adjusted R
2 are all very high ranging from a minimum of 
0.959 for Darwin to 0.981 for Adelaide. The estimated cointegrating vectors, capturing 
the long-run effects of the price of Tapis crude oil (ot) and the Singapore price of 
unleaded petrol (st) on Australia’s petrol prices, are all statistically significant at 1 per 
cent or better with the expected positive signs. The long-run elasticity of petrol price with 
respect to ot across all seven capital cities vary from a minimum of 0.065 in Perth to an 
unusually high value of 0.146 in Darwin. It should be noted that this elasticity is roughly 
around 0.07-0.08 mark for all other six capital cities.    
Table 1: Sources and definitions of the monthly data employed (May 1998- January 2009).    
Variable  Unleaded petrol price (Pit)  in:  Ot S t E t 
Description Adelaide  Brisbane  Darwin  Hobart  Melbourne  Perth  Sydney Tapis crude oil 
spot price
6 
Singapore 
unleaded 
petrol price
6 
Exchange 
rate 
Sources AAA
1 AAA
1 AAA
1 AAA
1 AAA
1 AAA
1 AAA
1 EIA
2 EIA
3 RBA
5 
Unit  Cents per 
litre 
Cents per 
litre 
Cents per 
litre 
Cents per 
litre 
Cents per 
litre 
Cents per 
litre 
Cents per 
litre 
FOB $A per 
Barrel 
FOB Cents 
per litre
4  $US per $A 
Mean  100.6  92.8  109.2 106.7 100.1 100.4  101.6  63.4  42.8  0.68 
Maximum 160.1 153.4 173.4 170.1 161.4 157.6  160.8  156.1  91.8  0.96 
Minimum 63.3 56.4 73.1 70.1 63.4 66.2  66.4  17.4  13.8  0.49 
Std.  Dev. 23.3 23.7 23.9 23.5 23.7 22.3  23.0  30.0  18.3  0.12 
CV  23.2 25.5 21.9 22.0 23.7 22.2  22.6  47.4  42.6  17.6 
Skewness 0.536 0.576 0.647 0.618 0.586 0.583  0.588  0.801  0.638  0.35 
Kurtosis  2.60 2.50 2.59 2.65 2.55 2.56  2.59  3.33  2.77  2.34 
Jarque-Bera  7.04 8.49 9.88 8.87 8.50 8.36  8.34 14.37  9.04  4.9 
P-value  0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.02  0.00  0.01  0.08 
Level form  Ln(P1)=p1 Ln(P2)=p2  Ln(P3)=p3  Ln(P4)=p4  Ln(P5)=p5  Ln(P6)=p6  Ln(P7)=p7  Ln(O)=o  Ln(S)=s  Ln(E)=e 
ADF  test  -1.52 -1.59 -1.35 -1.64 -1.62 -1.68  -1.65  -1.81 -1.79  -1.35 
P-Value  0.52 0.49 0.61 0.46 0.47 0.44  0.46  0.37  0.39  0.61 
Optimum  lag  8 3 2 2 2 2  2  2  2  1 
First 
difference  ∆p1  ∆p2  ∆p3  ∆p4  ∆p5  ∆p6  ∆p7  ∆o  ∆s  ∆e 
ADF  test  -5.14 -7.43 -8.14 -7.37 -8.42 -8.59  -8.43  -9.06 -9.22  -9.78 
P-Value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Optimum  lag  7 2 1 1 1 1  1  0  1  0 
 
1. Australian Automobile Association: www.aaa.asn.au/issues/petrol.htm 
2. Energy Information Administration: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm 
3. Energy Information Administration: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rp15sin5d.htm  
4. Gallon has been converted to litre assuming 1gallon=3.785 litre 
5. Reserve Bank of Australia: http://www.rba.gov.au/Statistics/HistoricalExchangeRates/index.html 
6. Ot and St were in the US dollars and US cents, respectively but they were converted to the Australian currency using the RBA’s exchange rate. 
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Table 2: Trace cointegration test results. 
Hypothesized no. of CE(s) 
for:  Eigenvalue  Trace 
Statistic 
0.05 Critical 
Value  P-value
**  Optimum 
lag 
Adelaide        3 
None 0.315  66.42
* 42.92  0.00   
At most 1  0.101  19.20  25.87  0.27   
At most 2  0.046  5.89  12.52  0.47   
Brisbane        3 
None 0.319  63.69
* 42.92  0.00   
At most 1  0.073  15.76  25.87  0.51   
At most 2  0.049  6.25  12.52  0.43   
Darwin        2 
None 0.259  55.22
* 42.92  0.00   
At most 1  0.071  17.51  25.87  0.38   
At most 2  0.063  8.17  12.52  0.24   
Hobart        2 
None 0.312  67.79
* 42.92  0.00   
At most 1  0.098  20.58  25.87  0.20   
At most 2  0.059  7.61  12.52  0.29   
Melbourne        3 
None 0.321  64.29
* 42.92  0.00   
At most 1  0.073  15.93  25.87  0.50   
At most 2  0.050  6.41  12.52  0.41   
Perth        3 
None 0.310  61.88
* 42.92  0.00   
At most 1  0.076  15.49  25.87  0.53   
At most 2  0.044  5.63  12.52  0.51   
Sydney        3 
None 0.312  64.47
* 42.92  0.00   
At most 1  0.085  17.68  25.87  0.37   
At most 2  0.052  6.64  12.52  0.38   
 
Note: 
* denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level; and 
** denotes the
 MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) 
p-values 
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Table 3: Long-run determinants of unleaded petrol prices in capital cities of Australia (1998M05-2009M01) 
Dependent variable 
R
2  2 R   Identifier  
Cointegrating vectors 
F-stat.  Residuals 
ADF t ratio 
ADF p-
value   
Ln(Pit)  Intercept  ot s T t  t 
Adelaide  0.981  0.980  Coefficient  2.574 0.074 0.325 0.001  2095     
     t-ratio 37.7  2.5  9.8  7.9    -5.31  0.00 
      p-value  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00     
Brisbane  0.980  0.979  Coefficient  2.448 0.073 0.326 0.002  2007     
     t-ratio  32.1 2.2  8.8 10.3   -4.73  0.00 
      p-value  0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00       
Darwin  0.959  0.958  Coefficient  3.123 0.146 0.169 0.002 980     
     t-ratio 34.1  3.7  3.8  7.8    -4.53  0.00 
      p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00       
Hob  0.966  0.965  Coefficient  2.915 0.080 0.261 0.002  1184     
     t-ratio 34.5  2.2  6.4  7.7    -4.51  0.00 
      p-value  0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00  0.00     
Melbourne  0.976  0.975  Coefficient  2.643 0.084 0.299 0.002  1683     
     t-ratio 34.3  2.5  8.0  8.4    -4.28  0.00 
      p-value  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00       
Perth  0.972  0.972  Coefficient  2.750 0.065 0.295 0.001  1468     
     t-ratio 35.62  1.9  7.9  7.8    -4.15  0.00 
      p-value  0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00  0.00     
Sydney  0.974  0.973  Coefficient  2.712 0.087 0.289 0.001  1562     
     t-ratio 35.5  2.6  7.8  7.3    -4.08  0.00 
      p-value  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00  0.00     
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The same thing can be said in relation to the long-run elasticity of petrol price 
with respect to st. With the exception of Darwin, the Singapore petrol price elasticity can 
narrowly vary from a minimum of 0.261 (Hobart) to a maximum of a 0.326 (Brisbane). In 
the case of Sydney, for instance 10 per cent rise in ot and st will result in 0.87 and 2.89 
per cent increase in the price of petrol in the long-run. The time trend variable (Tt) is also 
highly significant and exerts a positive impact on each dependent variable. Based on these 
results, one can conclude that as expected both Tapis crude oil and the Singapore 
unleaded petrol price are the two major long-run determinants of Australian petrol price 
with the latter exerting a higher impact in terms of the magnitude of its estimated long-
run elasticities.  
Starting with a maximum lag of five (k=5) in equation (3), the general-to-specific 
methodology is used to omit the insignificant variables in this equation on the basis of a 
battery of maximum likelihood tests and the AIC as a model selection criterion. Using 
I(0) variables in the estimating procedure, joint zero restrictions are imposed on the 
explanatory variables in the general model or equation (3) to obtain the most 
parsimonious and robust estimators. The empirical results for the parsimonious models 
capturing short-run dynamics for unleaded petrol prices in seven capital cities are 
presented in Table 4. The estimated coefficients of the final specific models are all 
statistically significant at least at the 10 per cent level or better and have the expected 
theoretical signs. Despite being in log difference forms, these equations also performs 
extremely well in terms of goodness-of-fit statistics. The adjusted R
2 varies from a 
minimum of 0.755 in Darwin to a maximum of 0.848 in Adelaide and the overall F test 
rejects the corresponding null hypothesis at the one per cent level. Furthermore, the 
estimated equations pass a battery of diagnostic tests and show no sign of 
misspecification, except for the Jarque-Bera normality test for Darwin and Hobart. The 
estimated coefficients have been sensibly signed, with log changes in both Tapis crude oil 
and the Singapore petrol price having positive short-run elasticities. Furthermore, at least 
one of the corresponding feedback coefficients( ) and/or   or  θ θθ
+−  for the EC term is 
highly significant, validating the significance of the cointegration relationship in the 
short-run model for petrol price. Based on the estimated short-run dynamic models 
presented in Table 4, the major findings of the paper have been summarised below. 
First, the Singapore price of petrol appears to be a major determinant of petrol 
prices for each and every capital cities in Australia not only in the long-run (See Table 3) 
but also in short-run (Table 4). Second, although Tapis crude oil price exerts a long-run 
influence on Australia’s petrol prices (see Table 3), its short-run impacts are confined to 
only three capital cities namely Brisbane, Darwin and Sydney) occurring with two or 
three months delay. The log changes of crude oil price did not have any instantaneous 
effect on changes in petrol prices in any Australia’ capital cities. Also the current and 
lagged values of this variable were not statistically significant for the other four cities and 
as a result they were not included in the estimated final equations in Table 4. It can thus 
be concluded that Australia’s short-run petrol prices in Adelaide, Hobart, Melbourne and 
Perth are mainly influenced by the current or lagged (up to three months) changes in the 
Singapore price of petrol. The short-run variations in the price of petrol in Brisbane, 
Darwin and Sydney on the other hand are mainly driven not only by the current or lagged 
(up to two months) changes in the Singapore petrol price but also by the lagged (up to 
three months) changes in the Tapis crude oil price.  Third, in all capital cities (with the 
only exception being Darwin) the short-run changes in the price of crude oil did not exert 
any asymmetry effects on the changes in petrol prices as 
1
0 :   ii H γγ
+− i = ∀  was rejected.
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 Table 4: Asymmetric short-run dynamic models for changes in petrol prices (1998M05-2009M01). 
Explanatory variables  Adelaide Brisbane   
Coefficient  t stat. P-value  Coefficient  t stat. P-value 
Intercept  -0.001391  -0.6 0.5265  -0.005749  -1.8 0.0781 
2 t o − Δ          0.053153  2.1  0.0388 
2 t o
−
− Δ                
3 t o
−
− Δ                
t s Δ   0.325082  19 0  0.337  17 0 
t s
− Δ                
t s
+ Δ                
1 t s − Δ    0.17175 10  0  0.234349 6.2  0 
2 t s − Δ                
2 t s
−
− Δ          0.084541  2.4  0.018 
3 t s
−
− Δ   0.081019 2.6  0.0113         
1 jt EC −                
1 jt EC
−
−   -0.350122 -2.7  0.0078  -0.545676  -4.4  0 
1 jt EC
+
−   -0.117606 -1.4  0.1536  0.003718  0 0.9662 
DUM-January               
DUM-April               
DUM-November         0.014493  2.1  0.0419 
DUM-December 0.012381  1.9  0.058 0.017727 2.6  0.0117 
1 it p − Δ            -0.228877  -2.7  0.0069 
Asymmetric test on the EC  term  Statistics   P-Value Statistics   P-Value 
0 : H θ θ
+− =   F(1,110)=2.65     0.09  F(1,116)=10.63    0.00 
EC:               
Lower value of grid for the threshold  -0.0299       -0.0332      
upper value of grid for the threshold  0.0367       0.0380      
Optimal value  -0.0204        -0.0177       
R
2  0.858      0.846      
2 R   0.848      0.834      
F-statistic 85.5    0.00  70.9    0.00 
DW    2.02       1.94      
Diagnostic tests               
Jarque-Bera 0.57    0.75  3.76    0.16 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM F 
Test:               
2 lags  1.80    0.17  0.24    0.79 
4 lags  1.60    0.18  1.17    0.33 
8 lags  1.64    0.14  0.96    0.47 
12 lags  1.60    0.18  1.05    0.41 
Heteroskedasticity Tests               
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey F test  1.50    0.19  0.70    0.70 
ARCH F test               
1 lag   0.00    1.00  0.05    0.83 
2 lags  0.51    0.60  1.11    0.33 
4 lags   1.60    0.18  0.92    0.40 
White F test               
With cross terms  0.71    0.90  0.85    0.73 
Without cross terms  0.85    0.57  0.97    0.47 
Ramsey RESET F Test:  2.10     0.32  1.66     0.20 
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Table 4  etric short-run dynam ls for changes in petrol prices. 
Explanatory variables  Ho
(continued): Asymm ic mode
Darwin   bart 
Coefficient  t   P   Coefficient t   P   stat. -value stat. -value
Intercept 0.0 1  2 0   0.0 2  0 0   05 .5  .01 00 .1  .92
2 t o − Δ                
2 t o
−
− Δ   0.0859 2.5  0.01         
3 t o
−
− Δ   0.0754 2.2  0.03         
t s Δ   0.1 2 11 0   0.1 0  11 0   78 .5 .00 97 .7  .00
t s
− Δ                
t s
+ Δ                
1 t s − Δ    0.1568 9.7  0.00  0.1932  10.4  0.00 
2 t s − Δ   0.0 4 1 0   0.0 9  2 0   34 .9 .07 48 .8  .01
2 t s
−
− Δ                
3 t s
−
− Δ                
1 jt EC −   -0.1178 -2   0   -0.2053  -4   0   .8 .01 .0 .00
1 jt EC
−
−                
1 jt EC
+
−                
DUM-January               
DUM-April               
DUM-November               
DUM-December               
1 it p − Δ                    
Asymmetric te  the EC term  P P st on Statistics    -Value  Statistics    -Value 
0 : H θ θ
+− =   F(1 0   F(1 1  0   ,117)=1.57   .21 ,121)=1.4   .24
EC:               
Lower value of grid for the threshold  -0.0515       -0.0378      
upper value of grid for the threshold  0   .0513     0   .0446     
Optimal value  0.0512        0.0433       
R
2  0.767      0.773     
2 R   0.755      0   .765     
F-statistic 64   .6   0.   0.   00 10 .8  3   00
DW   2.02      2.09      
Diagnostic tests               
Jarque-Bera 14 2  0.   19 5  0.   .1   00 .6   00
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM F 
Test:               
2 lags  2.29    0.11  0.42    0.66 
4 lags  1.27    0.29  0.40    0.81 
8 lags  0.89    0. 3  5 0. 3  3   0. 5  9
12 lags  0.93    0.51  0.43    0.95 
Heteroskedasticity Tests               
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey F test  0.59    0.73  1.53    0.20 
ARCH F test               
1 lag   0.05    0.82  0.22    0.64 
2 lags  0.09    0.91  0.74    0.48 
4 lags   0.52    0. 2  7 0. 1  4   0. 0  8
8 lags  0.36    0.94  0.14    1.00 
White F test               
With cross terms  0.65    0.90  0.74    0.73 
Without cross terms  1.72    0.12  0.33    0.86 
Ramsey RESET F Test:  1.29     0.26  1.11     0.29 Valadkhani: Modelling the Price of Unleaded Petrol 
Table 4 (continued): Asymmetric short-run dynamic models for changes in petrol prices. 
Explanatory variables 
Melbourne   Perth 
Coefficient  t stat. P-value  Coefficient  t stat. P-value 
Intercept -0.000975  -0.4  0.7135  0.0064  2.6  0.01 
2 t o − Δ                
2 t o
−
− Δ                
3 t o
−
− Δ                
t s Δ   0.307729 17  0         
t s
− Δ          0.3412  13.1  0.00 
t s
+ Δ          0.2334  7.0  0.00 
1 t s − Δ    0.156855 8.4  0  0.1713  9.9 0.00 
2 t s − Δ                
2 t s
−
− Δ                
3 t s
−
− Δ   0.094017 2.9  0.0047         
1 jt EC −          -0.1150  -2.3  0.03 
1 jt EC
−
−   -0.414065 -4  0.0001         
1 jt EC
+
−   -0.116623 -1.5  0.1326         
DUM-January         -0.0111  -1.7  0.09 
DUM-April         -0.0118  -1.7  0.08 
DUM-November               
DUM-December 0.016535  2.4  0.0178         
1 it p − Δ                    
Asymmetric test on the EC term  Statistics    P-Value  Statistics    P-Value 
0 : H θ θ
+− =   F(1,118)=4.69   0.0324  F(1,119)=0.77   0.38 
EC:              
Lower value of grid for the threshold  -0.0368       -0.0319     
upper value of grid for the threshold  0.0459       0.0423     
Optimal value  -0.0244        -0.0291       
R
2  0.816      0.838   
2 R   0.807      0.828   
F-statistic 87.4    0.00  88.4    0.00 
DW   2.30       2.04     
Diagnostic tests               
Jarque-Bera 2.90    0.23  3.00    0.22 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM F 
Test:               
2 lags  2.26    0.11  0.59    0.56 
4 lags  1.89    0.12  0.43    0.79 
8 lags  1.20    0.31  0.41    0.91 
12 lags  1.06    0.40  0.43    0.95 
Heteroskedasticity Tests              
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey F test  0.53    0.78  0.50    0.81 
ARCH F test              
1 lag   0.33    0.57  0.23    0.63 
2 lags  0.40    0.67  0.12    0.88 
4 lags   0.26    0.90  0.23    0.92 
8 lags  0.51    0.85  0.37    0.94 
White F test               
With cross terms  0.63    0.91  0.73    0.86 
Without cross terms  0.36    0.90  0.58    0.79 
Ramsey RESET F Test:  1.29     0.26  0.04     0.85 
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Table 4 (continued): Asymmetric short-run dynamic models for changes in petrol prices. 
Explanatory variables  Sydney  
Coefficient  t stat.  P-value 
Intercept  0.0013 0.5  0.65 
2 t o − Δ   0.0379 2.0  0.05 
2 t o
−
− Δ         
3 t o
−
− Δ         
t s Δ         
t s
− Δ   0.3242 12.8  0.00 
t s
+ Δ   0.2263 6.9  0.00 
1 t s − Δ    0.1492 8.6  0.00 
2 t s − Δ         
2 t s
−
− Δ         
3 t s
−
− Δ         
1 jt EC −         
1 jt EC
−
−   -0.2596 -2.7  0.01 
1 jt EC
+
−   -0.0285 -0.4  0.68 
DUM-January        
DUM-April        
DUM-November        
DUM-December        
1 it p − Δ           
Asymmetric test on the EC term  Statistics    P-Value 
0 : H θ θ
+− =   F(1,119)=3.10   0.08 
EC:  ECM7     
Lower value of grid for the threshold  -0.03628      
upper value of grid for the threshold  0.046328      
Optimal value  0.02772       
R
2  0.829     
2 R   0.819     
F-statistic  82.3   0.00 
DW   2.01      
Diagnostic tests        
Jarque-Bera  4.40   0.12 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM F Test:        
2 lags  0.13   0.88 
4 lags  0.12   0.97 
8 lags  0.45   0.89 
12 lags  0.41   0.96 
Heteroskedasticity Tests         
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey F test  0.82    0.56 
ARCH F test         
1 lag   1.05   0.40 
2 lags  1.52   0.22 
4 lags   1.20   0.31 
8 lags  0.84   0.57 
White F test        
With cross terms  0.67    0.92 
Without cross terms  0.82    0.58 
Ramsey RESET F Test:  1.11     0.29 
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Fourth, except in Darwin and Hobart that 
2
0 :   ii H ηη
+− i = ∀  could not be rejected, this 
hypothesis was rejected at the 5 per cent level of significance for the other five cities and for some 
values of i. Therefore, it can be stated that changes in the Singapore petrol prices have asymmetrical 
impacts on petrol prices in all capital cities except Darwin and Hobart. It is interesting to note that 
where significant, the estimated coefficient for ti s
−
− Δ was greater than the corresponding coefficient 
for . So in those capital cities for which  ti s
+
− Δ
2
0 :   ii Hi ηη
+− = ∀ were rejected, on an absolute value 
basis negative changes in the Singapore price could exert greater impacts on petrol prices compared 
to the corresponding positive changes of the same magnitude. This means for example 10 per cent 
decrease in  will lead to greater changes in  ti s
−
− Δ t p Δ than a similar 10 per cent increase in ti s
+
− Δ . This 
might appear to be quite favourable to consumers in the short-run but the analysis is not complete 
without undertaking a formal test on the third hypothesis, which is 
3
0 : H θ θ
+ − = . 
Fifth, the results in Table 4 indicate that 
3
0 : H θ θ
+ − =  can be rejected at 9 per cent level of 
significance or better for Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney, supporting the asymmetric 
price adjustment hypothesis. For these four cities the estimated θ
−coefficients (in terms of their 
absolute values) were far greater than their corresponding θ
+coefficients. This means that 
according to the past data when the short-run prices are above the long-run path (see equation 2), 
retail suppliers in these cities on average are more inclined to reduce their price to the equilibrium 
level very sluggishly. But on the other hand when petrol prices are below the long-run path, retail 
distributors increase their prices immediately to the equilibrium level.  j θ
−  varies from a minimum 
of  0.26 − in Sydney to a maximum of  0.55 − in Brisbane, suggesting that between 26-55 per cent of 
the short-run deviation (i.e. under pricing) from the long-run path is eliminated each month. Based 
on these results if prices were above the long-run path, within 2-4 months that divergence would 
have disappeared. According to the magnitude of the estimated adjustment coefficients in Brisbane 
( ) and Melbourne ( ), petrol price increases are passed on to the consumer 
faster than price decreases. 
2 0.55 θ
− =− 5 0.41 θ
− =−
However, when the short-run deviations are positive (prices are above the long-run path), 
the speed of adjustment coefficients are much slower and/or statistically insignificant (see the 
estimated coefficients of 1 jt EC
+
− or  j θ
+ for Adelaide, Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney). Under these 
circumstances, the short-term variations in prices mainly corrected through variations in 
 and to a lesser extent through the lagged changes in crude oil prices. 
Therefore, the asymmetric price adjustments do exist for four out of seven Australia’s capital cities 
since 
 and/or   or  ti ti t ss
−+
−− ΔΔ i s − Δ
jj θ θ
+− > . As can be seen from the estimated Wald tests in Table 4 no evidence of 
asymmetric price adjustment was found for Darwin, Hobart and Perth. The estimated symmetric 
speed of adjustment or  j θ  are -0.118, -0.205 and -0.115 for Darwin, Hobart and Perth, respectively. 
Based on absolute values, the speed of adjustment for these three cities is also much lower than j θ
−  
obtained for the other four cities
4. 
Sixth, the month-of-the year effects are significant in only four out of seven cities: positive 
impacts on average petrol price changes in December (Adelaide, Brisbane and Melbourne) and 
November (Brisbane) and negative impacts on the average price of petrol in Perth in both January 
and April. There are three possible explanations for the asymmetric response of petrol prices: (a) the 
                                                       
4  It should be noted that the optimum threshold values ranged (expressed in natural logarithm) from a minimum of -
0.0204 (Adelaide) to a maximum of 0.0512 (Darwin), translating to 0.97 cents and 1.05 cents, respectively. Since the 
threshold value () τ  is so close to zero (when the dotted and solid graphs intersect each other in Figure 1), the optimum 
value will be in vicinity of points a, b and c in Figure 1. 
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oligopolistic price coordination theory (e.g Borenstein, Cameron & Gilbert 1997), (b) the 
production and inventory cost of adjustment (e.g. Kaufmann & Laskowski, 2005), and (c) the 
search theory (Johnson, 2002). Based on oligopolistic coordination theory, an increase in the price 
volatility can lead to a faster response of petrol prices to an oil price decrease and a reduction in the 
degree of asymmetry in the petrol price response. According to the search theory, an increase in 
retail price of petrol raises the incentive to search for a lower priced retail outlet, while a decrease in 
the price lowers the incentive to search. Peltzman (2000) also believes various measures of 
imperfect competition, inventory cost, inflation-related asymmetric menu costs, and input price 
volatility determine the degree of such an asymmetry. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper tests the asymmetric responses of petrol prices at retail level to the positive and negative 
changes in each of the major sources of petrol price rises which are (1) Tapis crude oil prices; and 
(2) the Singapore petrol prices. The asymmetric effect of the error-correction term, representing the 
price deviation from its long-run path, has also been tested in the proposed models. This means that 
the negative and positive deviations from the long-run equilibrium prices are also allowed to exert 
asymmetric effects in the short-run error correction model. 
It is found that in the long-run petrol prices in Australia are mainly determined by both 
Tapis crude oil and the Singapore unleaded petrol price, with the latter exerting a higher impact in 
terms of the magnitude of its estimated long-run elasticities. The results indicate that in the case of a 
short-run price perturbation, petrol price increases are mostly passed on to the consumer faster than 
price decreases. In four major capital cities (i.e. Adelaide, Brisbane Melbourne and Sydney), it is 
found that  jj θ θ
− >
+ , providing convincing evidence in support of asymmetric price adjustments 
and the Bacon’s (1991) “rockets-and-feathers hypothesis”. In other word, petrol prices respond 
quickly following negative deviation from the long-run patch and there would be much slower 
adjustment speed when petrol prices are above the long-run equilibrium path. One can thus argue 
that there are a significant degree of market inefficiency and/or collusion or tacit collusion, requiring a 
closer government price monitoring and scrutiny. 
Of course these results are very aggregate and not specific enough to policy formulation. 
Future research can use more disaggregated data to provide relevant region-specific policy 
implications. For example, to achieve this, one can purchase daily data for 113 sample retail petrol 
stations over the same period (1998-2009) across seven states from the Australian Automobile 
Association. The results of such a disaggregated analysis can then assist relevant government and 
private agencies (such as the ACCC, the Australian Automobile Association, Australian Institute of 
Petroleum, FuelWatch and MotorMouth etc.), which can play an important role in market efficiency 
and consumers’ protection.  For instance, motorists can find out in which sample retail outlet and/or 
geographical areas petrol price increases are passed on to them (if any) faster than price decreases 
and vice versa. The use of aggregated data can mask the existing price differences in small regional 
towns and rural areas. However, based on aggregate results this paper finds enough evidence for 
overall asymmetric price responses, justifying an urgent need for conducting further research and 
monitoring/regulating the price of petrol set by major oil companies in Australia. The use of more 
disaggregated data can make the retail and wholesale petrol markets more transparent by rigorously 
examining and testing the asymmetric petrol price responses arising from all of its possible external 
sources and providing region-specific recommendations. 
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